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Abstract 
This article considers the place of knowledge in developing a socially just curriculum. It pursues the 
unusual route of a critique of Social Realism, a small but influential tendency in curriculum studies 
which claims that knowledge has been squeezed out by recent curriculum reforms and that there has 
been a descent into relativism. This paper shares the Social Realist view that ‘powerful knowledge’ 
is needed, and particularly by disadvantaged or marginalised young people. However, it critiques 
Social Realism's limited definition of 'powerful knowledge', arguing that for knowledge to be truly 
powerful, it must open up issues of power and inequality. It contests the Social Realist argument 
that critical pedagogy which begins from a subaltern stance is intrinsically relativist, arguing instead 
that alternative perspectives can help uncover concealed truths and break through hegemonic 
paradigms and ideologies. It argues that this is entirely compatible with a Critical Realist 
epistemology. Further, the paper presents reasons why a socially just curriculum needs to draw 
upon the vernacular knowledge of marginalised groups as well as the canonical knowledge of 
academic disciplines to produce truly powerful knowledge and a social justice curriculum.  
Keywords: knowledge, Social Realism, relativism, standpoint, funds of knowledge, curricular 
justice, Critical Realism 
 
Introduction 
This article aims to develop an argument concerning the place of knowledge in a socially just 
curriculum. It does so by the unusual route of a critique of ‘Social Realism’ - a small but influential 
intervention into curriculum studies which has set out simultaneously to insist on a central role for 
knowledge and to oppose relativism. Among other arguments, this article pursues Social Realists' 
deployment of the term powerful knowledge by raising issues about power and inequality, and 
argues that a Social Justice curriculum must somehow combine an engagement with both key 
canonical knowledge and the vernacular culture of the learners’ communities.  
We have good reason to thank the Social Realists for seeking to raise the profile of knowledge in 
the curriculum debate. This was an essential challenge to the technical instrumentalism which had 
infected curriculum policy at various levels in England and some other anglophone countries, 
whereby, for example, universities are expected to demonstrate how each course provides 
employability skills and knowledge which leads to practical applications (Moore and Young 2001: 
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448). The marginalisation of knowledge affected secondary education in England under a neoliberal 
New Labour government through the promotion of low-level vocational courses from the age of 14, 
including their spurious ‘equivalence’, for accountability purposes, with higher grade GCSEs. 
Subsequently through legislation (Education and Inspections Act 2006) a vocational diploma from 
age 14 annulled students’ entitlement to study history, geography, foreign languages, design and 
technology subjects and creative arts. The Social Realists, correctly in my view, rail against the way 
New Labour’s neoliberal accountability machine ascribed equal value to Physics and 'Travel and 
Tourism'. More broadly, they complain that the current ‘hyperaccountability regime’ results in a 
‘narrowing or dessication of knowledge’, teaching to the test, and ‘expensive courses run by 
examiners providing tips to maximize their pupils’ grades’ (Young et al 2014: 130-1).  
A central figure in the Social Realist turn is MFD Young, who four decades earlier had a leading 
role  in what became known as the New Sociology of Education. His return to Knowledge has had 
some echoes internationally. Like Muller (2000), he had worked in post-apartheid South Africa 
where, partly due to poorly qualified teachers, an initial emphasis on cultural diversity degenerated 
into the accreditation of basic domestic skills such as ‘driving a car, tying your shoelaces, cooking 
rice’ (Hoadley and Jansen 2009:181, cited in Zipin et al 2015). Later, Elizabeth Rata (2012) 
condemned the cultural relativism infecting academic and professional bodies in New Zealand, 
seeing this as the substitution of cultural heritage experiences for reliable disciplinary knowledge.  
The initial stimulus, a paper by Rob Moore and Johan Muller (1999) on the threat of culturalist 
relativism, led Young (2000; also Moore and Young 2001) to extend the discussion and eventually 
abandon the New Sociology of Education of the 1970s (Young 1971; Whitty and Young 1976; 
Young and Whitty 1977).  
It would be an error to view Social Realism as a turning away from politically progressive aims and 
alignments. Unfortunately however, a lack of precision, indeed a tendency to conflate diverse 
arguments, has led to a situation in which the knowledge turn - ‘Bringing knowledge back in’ 
(Young 2008) - has opened up opportunities for the supporters of neoconservative curriculum 
reform, and most significantly through the 2014 revision of the National Curriculum for England 
led by Michael Gove, then Secretary of State for Education. It is certainly the case that Gove has 
used the Knowledge turn (both in its Social Realist and Hirschian versions) to design a curriculum 
which is overloaded with factual content and which places excessive and age-inappropriate 
demands on children. This does not, however, mean that Young and colleagues are politically 
aligned with Gove, and indeed Young, who has always located on the political Left, has sought to 
distance himself from this misuse of his work.  
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Although Social Realism is rather a small movement, with few signed-up advocates, its partial 
resonance with certain aspects of the New Right position, and its claim to promote a Social Justice 
orientation, make it an important theory to bring under scrutiny. Because Young has played a 
leading part in this small movement, as he did in the New Sociology, the present paper will 
inevitably use many quotations from his work; this will hopefully not be read as an argument ad 
hominem. It is the issues which are important, and the need to articulate principles for a Social 
Justice curriculum as part of a wider international debate.  
 
Social Realism, social justice and critical thinking  
The emergence of the Social Realist paradigm can be read as a reaction to some problematic 
tendencies in curriculum change in recent decades in some anglophone countries, particularly 
England, South Africa and New Zealand. This section will argue, however, that there is 
considerable confusion in the way the issue has been analysed, presented and polemicised.    
Confusion arises particularly from Social Realism’s construction of a composite enemy which 
elides 1970s progressivism with the neoliberal instrumentalism of recent decades. A diversity of 
phenomena and initiatives are bundled together, including vocationalism, an increasingly 
instrumental view of education, interdisciplinary studies, and the curriculum becoming ‘open to 
leisure, sports and other community interests.’  We are told that ‘child centredness has replaced 
subject-centred teaching’, though it is unclear when this happened and the school curriculum of 
countries subject to high-stakes accountability systems can  hardly be characterised as 'child-
centred'. Social Realists see themselves as combatting ‘the relativism of much progressive skills-
led educational thinking and its corollary that the curriculum should be based on pupil’s 
interests’ (Young et al 2014:165 and 168), yet the skills-led courses of recent decades are 
driven by neoliberal demands for more effective human capital production rather than 
progressive educators' sensitivity to children's needs. Indeed progressivism of any kind is 
currently in short supply.  
Social realism signally misrecognises the increasing state domination of the curriculum in 
many countries, making the bizarre claim that: 
Since roughly the 1980s educationists in various guises as teachers, teacher educators, 
advisers and consultants have become the dominant influence in national curriculum 
formulation. (ibid:165) 
At this point, it is worth considering the nature of the earlier ‘New Sociology of Education’ in 
which Young was a key player but which he has now rejected. The problem of conflation and ill-
 4 
prepared generalisation was a problem even then, as Richard Pring’s (1972) critique of the 1971 
edited collection (Young 1971) shows. In that essay, Pring raised demands for clarification, based 
on a powerful plea for philosophical realism. Pring asked just how much of knowledge can be 
ascribed to sociological influences and whether this applies to all disciplines equally: are 
mathematics and science ‘human constructs in the same sense as the legal apparatus is a human 
construct?’ Pring argued that not everything can be ascribed to the ‘social distribution of power’ 
since reality places constraints on the human freedom to construct an explanation:  
That we distinguish between cats and dogs may be due to certain social conditions; that we 
can so distinguish has something to do with cats and dogs. (ibid: 188) 
Furthermore, he warned that we must distinguish between the social conditions under which 
knowledge is produced and its truth value.  
The valid canons of scientific method... transcend the idiosyncrasies of particular 
individuals and social contexts... The particular direction science has taken bears some 
relation to the social condition (the consequence of the armaments or space race, for 
example) and the very scientific theories propounded might bear some relation to non-
scientific facts (as in the suppression of evidence). But such considerations in no way affect 
the validity of what is said in science and the possibility of having one’s results validated by 
other scientists, irrespective of their social condition. (ibid: 190-1) 
Young now accepts these arguments but at a cost. Despite some caveats, Social Realism shows little 
interest nowadays in social and cultural influences on canonical knowledge. Whereas the New 
Sociology of Education was excessively ‘constructivist’ in rejecting canonical knowledge in the 
1970s, Social Realism is too ready to accept an imposition by central government of canonical texts 
and truths.  
This paper intends to clarify some of the sources of confusion in Social Realism in order to develop 
a more secure understanding of Knowledge as an organising concept in curriculum studies and 
curriculum change. There is a danger that ‘knowledge’ can be a feel-good word which operates 
ideologically because it is difficult to oppose. At the same time, I will try to avoid any polemical 
attack based on limited citation, caricature or guilt by association. It would be beyond the scope of 
this paper to write a comprehensive review of all Social Realist texts, and there are inevitably 
paragraphs and texts where views are moderated or even contradicted. Rather the focus will be on 
certain key themes, using a selection of examples and quotations which represent an enduring 
position in Social Realism.  
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The relativist threat to Knowledge 
One important strand of the Social Realist case is that the belief in objective knowledge has been 
eroded and that relativism is systematically undermining truth. Although this argument was first 
raised with some caution, it has become increasingly confused and strident.  
Moore and Muller’s concerns (1999) broadly targeted the danger of relativism from the New 
Sociology of Education along with sociologies of natural science research after Kuhn, a feminist 
emphasis on voice and perspective, and postmodernism in general. The root problem was labelled 
‘voice discourse’, identified as exaggerating the importance of the knower as against the knowledge:  
The discourse of ‘voice’ is identified with a position that has recurred periodically since the 
early 1970s, which reduces knowledge to experience in order to de-legitimise rational, 
epistemologically grounded knowledge forms and truth claims that are represented as 
expressing no more than the ‘standpoints’ and ‘interests’ of ‘dominant’ social groups. 
(Moore and Muller 1999:189) 
This text sutured ‘voice’ with an emphasis on learning through experience, and with the error of 
valuing vernacular knowledge as highly as academic knowledge (profane vs sacred in Durkheim’s 
terms (1983)). A decade later, Moore’s 2009 book Towards the sociology of truth discussed these 
issues in great depth and detail.  
Subsequent papers (Young 2000; Moore and Young 2001) extended and clarified the accusation of 
relativism; the latter paper began to apply it to both neo-conservative and technical instrumentalist 
influences on curriculum formation in Britain, with an insufficiently clear distinction between the 
two. At this stage the discussion of the influence of social elements on knowledge formation is 
balanced and illuminating, leading to the balanced conclusion that:  
 Relativism does not necessarily follow from a ‘social’ theory of knowledge. 
 A social theory must recognize that some knowledge is objective in ways that transcend the 
historical conditions of its production (e.g. Euclid’s geometry and Newton’s physics). 
(Moore and Young 2001:453-4) 
Further, in an argument against ‘standpoint theory’, Moore and Young argue convincingly (453) 
that knowledge must not be reduced to experience, and that unless we accept concepts and 
categories which transcend experience, research will only lead to ‘non-generalisable findings and 
localised curricula’.  
Subsequently however, Young has made more sweeping claims, in terms of  
 the risks of relativism  
 6 
 the dangers of making space for vernacular knowledge in the curriculum  
 a general decline in knowledge within formal learning 
 the kind of curriculum reforms which produce a threat to knowledge 
 the political source and orientation of this threat 
 a suggestion that ‘educationalists’ are collectively opposed to knowledge. 
To illustrate these arguments, consider the following quotations from a speech for the Cambridge 
Assessment Network (Young 2014, my italics).  
If all knowledge is situated, this leads to a relativism which rejects the assumption of their 
being better knowledge in any field that could or should underpin the curriculum.  
There were a string of curriculum developments somewhat euphemistically titled 
Mathematics for the Majority, and Science and Geography for the ‘young school leaver’. 
The knowledge base of traditional subjects was weakened so that more practical, work-
related and community oriented activities could be included which it was hoped to interest 
the so-called ‘non-academic’ child. 
The central role of knowledge in education has undoubtedly declined over the years.  
A ‘fear of knowledge’ has come to pervade much thinking in the educational community 
and more broadly the thinking of those on the Left involved in education.  
Why are educationalists not fighting for that entitlement to knowledge for all but actually 
opposed to it?     
There are various confusions and conflations here:  
a) Any understanding of social influences on the generation of knowledge is assumed to open the 
floodgates to relativism.  
b) Progressive curriculum reforms introduced to prepare for the raising of the school leaving age to 
16, and to improve their access to academic subjects as part of the comprehensive school 
reform, are elided with a more recent neoliberal vocationalism.  
c) Left academics are collectively blamed for neoliberal government policies which excluded 
roughly half of 14-16 year olds from a broad and balanced curriculum. 
There is no attempt to examine or justify empirically the claim that the inclusive curricular projects 
of the early 1970s did actually dilute or abandon the disciplinary knowledge base, nor indeed do we 
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find a detailed scrutiny of the recent vocational qualifications in schools, some of which may have 
had a stronger knowledge component than others. 
 
Standpoint theory and relativism 
A particular target of Social Realism has been 'standpoint theory', identified with Sandra Harding 
and Donna Haraway. This is seen as quintessentially relativist, in that it substitutes beliefs deriving 
from partial / personal experience for impartial / objective truth. It can however be argued that this 
is a misreading of standpoint epistemologies.  
The 2001 paper by Moore and Young, discussed in the previous section, raises questions which 
sociology of knowledge must take on board, particularly when applied to natural sciences. The 
authors distinguish between two different senses of contextual influence, the immediate activities of 
scientific production and the impact of ‘external’ interests. Whilst acknowledging that the historical 
conditions of  scientific production might have some influence on the process of scientific 
discovery, they insist that this does not invalidate its product.  
Although this is largely true, there are significant silences in the text. It lacks strong examples of 
where social forces may affect conclusions, eg the influence of pharmaceutical companies on drugs 
trials, the underfunding of some areas of research, or the tendency of many scientists to regard 
scientific research as simply technical and without social implications. A realist sociology of 
knowledge should be able to recognise that such forces can distort knowledge without the critique 
collapsing into relativism.  
The Social Realist argument is substantially built on the conviction that emphasising the standpoint 
of theorists and researchers leads to relativism. Zipin, Fataar and Brennan (2015) provide an 
important counter-argument. They share Haraway’s (1988) view that 
 ways of seeing/knowing ‘realities’ are always partial in being positional; we see from 
somewhere (standpoints), not everywhere.... However, standpoint theorists see partialities of 
epistemic perspective as grounded in ontological gravities of historically materialised social 
structures, which are neither infinite nor equally weighty. Hence, partialities are not a matter 
of ‘anything goes’; standpoint theorists thus refute notions that their approach is ‘relativist’. 
Rather situated perspectives represent partial objectivities of insight into social-ontological 
realities. It is then possible to pursue a robust social science that triangulates partial 
perspectives via methodologies of ‘power-sensitive conversation’, yielding ‘stronger 
objectivity’ than the ‘God trick’ (Haraway 1988) of supposed objectification from a dis-
interested universal perspective. (Zipin et al p15) 
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Drawing on Harding, they argue that accounts written from a particular perspective provide not 
only a local or personal knowledge but shed light on society as a whole.  
These accounts are not fundamentally about marginal [partial] lives; instead they start off 
research from them; they are about the rest of the local and international social order. The 
point... is not to generate ethnosciences, but sciences – systematic causal accounts of how 
the natural and social orders are organized. (Harding 1992:582-3, my italics). 
Gail Edwards (2014:169) extends this by arguing that ‘social realists [mistakenly] take standpoint 
theory to be synonymous with “voice discourses” and postmodernist irrealism’. She argues, by 
contrast, that standpoint theory is entirely compatible with realism, and in particular with the theory 
of Critical Realism (ibid:172seq). This is an important challenge, given that Social Realists have 
recently sought to co-opt Critical Realism to their position. (This question will be discussed in 
detail later, in the section Scholarly communities and reliable knowledge.)  
 
The privileging of propositional knowledge 
One area of congruence between Social Realism and the current version of National Curriculum in 
England revolves round the emphasis on propositional knowledge, which is privileged over more 
experiential modes of learning. This emphasis entails the divorce of cognitive from ethical / 
political and aesthetic aspects of knowledge. Although Young allows a role for personal / 
vernacular experience in the learning process, he seeks to delegitimise it as an appropriate aspect of 
the school curriculum. In other words, he accepts vernacular experience as a route towards 'real 
knowledge' but not as a fitting object for curricular attention.  
Gail Edwards’ (2014) argument, by contrast, bridges between curriculum and pedagogy, showing 
that vernacular experience and culture is a valid aspect of curriculum, whereas the Social Realists 
repeatedly seeks to relegate the use of vernacular experience to classroom pedagogies. They see 
vernacular experiences as devices to assist the transmission and acquisition of canonical knowledge 
but not as a source of important knowledge or as the object of academic analysis.  
Implicit in the Social Realist argument is a reductive understanding of ‘pedagogy’, using the word 
as synonymous with teaching techniques (cf more European understandings, as explained by 
Alexander 2000:551 or Wrigley 2003:127-8). Conversely, curriculum is implicitly reduced to a set 
of content when learners and context are left out of consideration.  
Some significant problems in the Social Realist position and its privileging of abstract knowledge 
come into view when we understand knowledge from a materialist perspective. A materialist 
philosophy (Eagleton, 2016) regards cognition as inseparable from bodily and social existence, and 
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rejects attempts to relegate aesthetic or ethical dimensions of our engagement with the world to an 
inferior position. An overemphasis on abstract formulations over lived experience actually distorts 
and diminishes both poles of knowledge (i.e. its abstract representation and its lived experiential 
aspect), disrupting the dialectical activity of learning. The interrelationship and balance between 
abstract concepts and lived experience or activity is a crucial issue in curriculum design.  
This is a matter of pressing contemporary relevance. The danger of over-privileging the abstract is 
clearly visible in the Gove revision of England’s National Curriculum (Wrigley 2014:36). Of 
critical importance, the officially approved mode of early literacy teaching, namely a dogmatic and 
exclusive deployment of synthetic phonics, divorces phonic decoding from meaning-making and 
the enjoyment of books. This is pointedly satirised by Mike Rosen:  
We at Ruth Miskin Academy are pioneering Miskin Kick Score Incorporated where in the 
first year you play Un-Football, by playing without the ball.  (Rosen 2012) 
The assumption running throughout the National Curriculum document for primary English is that 
children will not be able to speak or write competently without a prior acquisition of elaborate rules. 
(This, of course, requires hundreds of detailed regulations, eg ‘If the root word ends with –ic, -ally 
is added rather than just –ly except in the word publicly.’) 
This mistaken view of the relationship between symbols and activity was clearly exposed by 
philosopher Gilbert Ryle in The concept of mind:  
The chef must recite his recipes to himself before he can cook according to them; the hero 
must lend his inner ear to some appropriate moral imperative before swimming out to save 
the drowning man; the chess-player must run over in his head all the relevant rules and 
tactical maxims of the game before he can make correct and skilful moves... (Ryle 1949:31) 
This does not mean that reflecting on principles and ideas is irrelevant, but rather locates reflection 
as a moment within practice:  
Certainly we often do not only reflect before we act but reflect in order to act properly. The 
chess-player may require some time in which to plan his moves before he makes them. Yet 
the general assertion that all intelligent performance requires to be prefaced by the 
consideration of appropriate propositions rings unplausibly... Efficient practice precedes the 
theory of it. (ibid:32) 
A recurrent trope in Social Realist texts is the insistence on a radical divorce between academic and 
everyday knowledge, as exemplified in the following quotations (Young et al 2014):  
 We do not make schooling compulsory for all 5 year olds just to extend their experience. (p31) 
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 If education is to be emancipatory... it has to be based on a break with experience. (p88)  
 The curriculum should exclude the everyday knowledge of students.’(p97)  
Even though a space is left for everyday knowledge as a useful tool in classroom teaching, the 
above quotations beg various questions in their ambiguity: whether schools might partly exist to 
extend students’ experience; whether it is possible or worthwhile to develop an intellectual and 
critical perspective on everyday knowledge (wonderfully exemplified by Noddings in her book of 
2006). Although these statements have a common sense appeal, the negative implications have to 
be considered: a curriculum which excludes students’ everyday knowledge might be anything but 
emancipatory. Fortunately Lambert’s contribution to the same book (Young et al 2014: 159-187) 
develops a more integrated and inclusive position, arguing that disciplinary concepts and methods 
can be used to organise, build upon and enrich everyday experience.  
Bernstein did not dismiss the everyday, but saw that it is the very interchange between 
expert or disciplinary discourses and 'common-sense' or everyday knowedge that is 
pedagogically powerful (ibid:163).  
The dialectic of experience and abstraction  
The privileging of propositional knowledge, discussed above, is accompanied by a neglect of the 
interrelationship between sensory experience and abstract concepts. Rather than using scientific 
concepts as a tool to develop, and sometimes challenge, situated understandings which emerge from 
students' everyday life, Social Realism calls for an abandonment of lived realities.   
Powerful knowledge, for Social Realists, is seen almost entirely in terms of abstract concepts. We 
see this clearly in the following geographical example about cities which I quote at length:  
Subjects bring together ‘objects of thought’ as systematically related sets of ‘concepts’. 
Sometimes, these concepts have referents outside school, in the environment of the pupil’s 
life, in a city like Auckland, for example. However, pupils’ relationships with Auckland as a 
‘concept’ should be different to their relationship with their ‘experience’ of Auckland as the 
place where they live. 
It is important that the pupils do not confuse the Auckland that the geography teacher talks 
about with the Auckland in which they live. To a certain extent, it is the same city, but the 
pupil’s relationship with it in the two cases is not the same. The Auckland where they live is 
‘a place of experience’. Auckland as an example of a city is ‘an object of thought’ or a 
‘concept’.  (Young 2010:25) 
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The argument is not simply that there are different ways of knowing a city, but that school 
knowledge should be limited to analytic concepts, and is superior to vernacular knowledge.  
If pupils fail to grasp the difference between thinking about Auckland as an example of the 
geographers’ concept of a city and their experience of living in Auckland, they will have 
problems learning geography, and by analogy, any school subject that seeks to take them 
beyond their experience. For example, the teacher might ask her class what the functions of 
the city of Auckland are. This requires that the pupils think of the city in its role in 
government and business and not to just describe how they, their parents, and their friends, 
experience living in the city. (p25-6)  
These explanations and examples are most revealing. The emphasis is on distinguishing concepts 
from experience, rather than relating them. Instead of using concepts to shed new light on the cities 
of our vernacular experience and to give us new ways of understanding the forces which affect 
phenomena, the Social Realists’ desire is for abstract concepts to replace our rich experience, which 
is more or less discounted. If,  on the other hand, we take a Critical Realist position on knowledge 
(Bhaskar 1978), we can appreciate the importance of digging below the surface, of demonstrating to 
students that the way they perceive phenomena might not capture the underlying forces which are at 
work, that these forces might not always be active or visible, that everyday experience is not always 
the best guide to understanding the structures that impact on our lives, and so on. Such powerful 
learning depends on bringing abstract knowledge and situated experiences into play with each 
other, rather than separating them and neglecting one pole of the dialectic.      
As Margaret Roberts (2014:197) points out, the key characteristics of cities cannot be reduced to 
universalistic generalisations but are highly contextualised. Furthermore, a social selection is at 
work here, in the authoritative view that the true functions of the city are ‘government and business’ 
rather than the homes and lives of the students’ families. Social Realism, in effect, does damage to 
knowledge in its attempt to make a binary separation of abstract concept from vernacular 
experience, and to valorise the former while  de-valuing the latter. This is a deeply reductionist 
view of knowledge. 
The contribution of everyday knowledge and experience to scientific understanding 
The case for validating everyday experience and perspectives in the formation of powerful 
academic knowledge has been argued within various fields and traditions during the past century, 
some of which are drawn upon in this section. Vernacular knowledge has been central to the growth 
of critical perspectives in literature and the humanities, underpinning works which are now 
regarded as academically authoritative. It also underpins Vygotskian psychology, which emphasises 
the processes whereby concepts inherited from our culture illuminate and reshape young people's 
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understandings, giving rise to the rich intellectual tradition known as Cultural and Historical 
Activity Theory (CHAT). It is worrying, therefore, to see a devaluing of vernacular experience and 
perspectives in the name of  'powerful  knowledge', and ironic that critical scholars are cited as if 
they provide a support for this.  
Young has a tendency to co-opt established theorists to the Social Realist camp, one of whom is 
Vygotsky. In the process, Vygotsky’s dialectical thinking is flattened to a one-sided emphasis on 
scientific concepts (see Roberts 2014:190-2). Gail Edwards, staying faithful to Vygotsky’s struggle 
to interrelate propositional and experiential aspects of knowledge, argues that learners' tacit 
understandings cannot be cast aside: 
While a curriculum syllabus may neglect situated ‘know-how’ because of its irreducibility 
to propositional knowledge, a background of tacit understanding is nonetheless essential for 
rendering declarative propositions intelligible. Learners can attend only from a tacit 
framework that integrates the perceptual and linguistic; in so doing, they seek to cope with 
reality. (Edwards 2014: 172)  
This goes beyond the pedagogic process. Everyday experience cannot be relegated to classroom 
tactics but is fundamental to curriculum,  both in terms of social responsibility and epistemology. 
Here, Edwards connects to the notion of 'standpoint', viewed as threatening by Social Realism, and 
argues for a richer understanding of the dialectic between the knower's standpoint and authoritative 
knowledge:  
Standpoint theory, when understood as a rejection of neutrality but not objectivity, 
leads to a view of working-class children’s knowledge not as inherently inferior, but 
as partial. Their knowledge reflects a structural reality within which others may be 
differently located. Thus, their everyday knowledge is a necessary starting point for 
enquiry that should lead to a higher reflexive consciousness of their standpoint 
within the wider world – that is, to strong objectivity. Standpoint theory thus does 
not reduce knowledge to the knower. On the contrary, it acknowledges the 
dialectical transaction between subjectivity and objective reality. (ibid: 182) 
It is not difficult to recollect examples of ‘subaltern’ perspectives and standpoints which have shed 
new light on a field of academic study: Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), Raymond Williams’ The 
Country and the City (1973), Gilbert and Gubar’s The Madwoman in the Attic (1979) to name a 
few. The socialist perspectives of Raymond Williams, Edward Thompson, Stephen Rose – and 
indeed Vygotsky - have helped reshape their academic fields, not just as canonical content but in 
terms of disciplinary procedures. The Alternative Shakespeares volumes (Drakakis 1985; Hawkes 
1996) bring together multiple new insights on this most canonical of authors: the perspectives of 
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female, gay, black and postcolonial critics may be ‘partial’ but they are not peripheral, trivial or 
unfaithful to the Shakespeare texts. ‘Standpoint’ cannot simply be written off by casually 
mentioning the Lysenko scandal (eg Young 2000).  
Margaret Roberts (2014) shows not only how children’s ‘own personal geographies of place, space 
and environment’ (p192) provide a foundation for acquiring systematic geographical knowledge, 
but that experience-related concepts are central to building the school curriculum: more concrete 
concepts such as beach, weather, the geography of food lead into more general or abstract ones such 
as settlement or urbanisation (p193). Her argument is that Social Realism is making a false 
dichotomy between everyday experience and disciplinary concepts:  
The issue for me is not whether the school geography curriculum should develop students’ 
knowledge beyond their existing experience. I know of no geography curriculum for any 
age group based entirely on students’ everyday knowledge. The issue is about whether a 
geography curriculum document setting out what students are required to study should 
exclude, as Young suggests, students’ everyday knowledge. (193)  
Furthermore, she demonstrates that academic Human Geography in universities is deeply rooted in 
experience (eg the geographies of food, human settlement, youth culture, migration, p195). 
Moreover academic geography draws on diverse perspectives, questions and methods to theorise 
them (ibid: 197).   
Social Realism, by contrast, insists on a sharp division between (abstract) school knowledge and 
(concrete) external reality (Durkheim's sacred and profane). Their argument is that profane 
knowledge is disorganised and unsystematic, thus necessitating a divorce between (plebeian) 
realities and reputable knowledge. Social Realists insist, therefore, on the insularity of academic 
knowledge.  
Vygotsky’s distinction between scientific and spontaneous (everyday, common sense) concepts is 
inappropriately co-opted into this argument. This, according to Edwards, is a misreading:  
Unlike the social realists, Vygotsky’s theory of development posited a dialectical, 
transactional relation between these (Vygotsky 1987)... In curriculum terms, Vygotsky’s 
account is not a rejection of pupils’ standpoint or historically embedded knowledge. Rather, 
it is to recognise that pupils’ everyday knowledge is a necessary but insufficient starting 
point because it transforms scientific thinking, and vice versa. (Edwards 2014:181)  
Zipin, Fataar and Brennan (2015:20) concur that this is a ‘highly dubious reading of Vygotsky’. For 
Vygotsky, there is a reciprocal and dialectical relationship. Spontaneous concepts, derived from 
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unschooled experiences, form the foundation for schooled scientific concepts; scientific concepts 
then provide new structures of relationship to the phenomena we experience in our everyday lives.  
Is there no educational merit to Vygotsky’s idea that scientific knowledge, interacting with 
everyday knowledge in school curriculum, offers power to systematise and clarify learners’ 
spontaneous conceptions, while learning also gains substance and vitality from those 
spontaneous conceptions emergent in practical engagement with life-worlds? (Zipin 2015: 
21)  
The lifeworld of the student cannot be relegated to an instrumental role, but is itself important. This 
is a curricular issue, and not simply a matter of effective class teaching, as Luis Moll (quoting 
Vygotsky) insists:  
Ultimately only life educates, and the deeper that life... burrows into the school, the more 
dynamic will be the educational process. That the school has been locked away and walled 
in as if by a tall fence from life itself has been its greater failing. Education is just as 
meaningless outside the... [life] world as is a fire without oxygen, or as breathing in a 
vacuum. The teacher’s educational work, therefore, must be inevitably connected with his 
[or her] creative social and life work. (Vygotsky 1997:345, quoted by Moll 2014:121; cited 
in Zipin et al 2015:23) 
Moll’s position is that ‘the relationship between everyday and scientific concepts is reciprocal’. In 
other words, ‘they mediate each other’. Moreover, scientific concepts ‘need vital connection to 
everyday concepts in order to sustain meaningful significance’ (summarised in Zipin 2015:23-4).  
The reduction of knowledge to abstract ‘scientific concepts’stripped of experience or activity 
proves a major obstacle when Social Realists consider the realities of school curriculum. It has a 
seriously limiting effect even on traditional versions of school curriculum. Thus Rata (2012:136) 
describes music education predominantly in terms of the acquisition of theoretical concepts, 
misunderstanding much about appreciation, performance or learning an instrument.  
Unlike the largely tacit and context bound process of learning folk music or playing in a 
garage band for example, the ‘curriculum’ for formal instrument learning is most often 
sequential and underpinned by abstract theoretical concepts which necessitate the explicit 
guidance of a teacher. (Rata 2012:136, citing McPhail, 2011)  
Rata has a valid argument that concepts structure content, help learners to see beyond the particular, 
and indeed make children intelligent, but the overwhelming impression is that the experiential / 
phenomenal aspect of knowledge has marginal significance. This one-sided understanding aligns 
with the neglect, in the current English assessment and accountability system, of practical and 
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creative subjects (eg the so-called Ebacc which is limited to traditional academic subjects). The 
overloading of explanations, or more frequently rules, and the marginalisation of experiences might 
result not in a stronger conceptual framework, but in a dessicated knowledge - fragments of inert 
facts (see Wrigley 2014:33-6). This does not amount to powerful knowledge.   
Concepts, and their systematic relationship within particular disciplines and subjects, should never 
be marginalised in curriculum design. This should not, however, lead to the opposite error of seeing 
knowledge as solely cognitive. There is a pedagogical / psychological need to move backwards and 
forwards between experience and abstraction (see the above discussion of Vygotsky; also, for 
example, Rogoff and Lave 1984; Wenger 1998:134-5; Salomon 1993; Engeström et al 1999). 
Further, this is also an epistemological issue. Bruner (1986:11seq) describes two ‘modes of thought’ 
which are ‘irreducible to one another’; ignoring one at the expense of the other will ‘inevitably fail 
to capture the rich diversity of thought’. He contrasts the ‘paradigmatic or logical-scientific’ mode 
with the narrative mode, showing that both provide important ways of seeing and understanding the 
world, neither more superficial than the other. Similarly, Wertsch points out the dangers of 
overprivileging the voice of ‘decontextualised rationality’ (Wertsch 1990). Wulf (2005) regards 
mimesis as indispensable in developing an understanding of the world, as well as identity 
formation. Even stronger arguments conceptualise ‘situated cognition’ (Robbins and Aydede 2009) 
rooted in a non-dualistic ontology in which the psychological and the somatic are inextricably 
interwoven (eg Bateson’s ‘ecology of mind’, 1973; Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, 1962; 
Mead’s biosocial ‘pragmatism’ 1934).  
Scholarly communities and reliable knowledge 
At this point, it is important to consider what forms the basis for reliable knowledge. The emphasis 
placed by social realists is on the academic community. I wish to argue, in this section, that this is 
insufficient, before proceeding to argue that distinctions between depth and surface knowledge are 
underwritten by epistemic principles and processes, not just the collective of individuals charged 
with carrying them out.  
In the Social Realist argument, the abstract vs concrete binary in forms of knowledge (discussed 
above) is matched by an equally strong binary between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’  in terms of the 
human sources of knowledge. For Social Realism, both these binaries are rooted in Durkheim’s 
(1983) distinction between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ (see Young 2008:40-5) as expanded by Bernstein 
(1999, summarised Young 2008:209-12). The former is privileged in both pairs, and scientific 
activity is regarded as the historical successor to 'the sacred'. This gives rise to another set of 
problems in the Social Realist position. 
The primary guarantee of truthfulness, in the Social Realist view, is the ‘sociality’ of the sacred:  
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Although knowledge is a social and human product, it is its sociality that gives knowledge 
an objectivity beyond the social processes associated with its acquisition and production. 
(Young 2008:38) 
The second guarantee, accompanying this, is its divorce from everyday material activity, and indeed 
from the empirical: 
The sacred was a collective product of a society, and not related directly to any real world 
problems. (ibid:147) 
Needless to say, everyday common-sense ‘horizontal’ knowledge is also communal in its 
production and sustenance, as indeed social realists acknowledge. The key point, for them, is the 
particular  sociality of academic research communities.  
The Social Realist tenet is that the particular social arrangements of academic research lead to 
reliable truth.  
The objectivity of knowledge is in part located in the social networks, institutions and codes 
of practice built up by knowledge producers over time. It is these networks of social 
relations that, in crucial ways, guarantee truth claims...Specialist forms of social 
organization remain the major social bases for guaranteeing the objectivity of knowledge. 
(Young 2008:31-2) 
Though ‘guarantees’ is moderated down in some other texts, consensus within scholarly 
communities is still regarded as the best assurance that we can have.  
There is a deep fallacy here. Arguably, just like natural scientists around the world, the global 
research community of Catholic theologians engaged in explicating and refining medieval canonical 
texts have claims to well-established methods and collaboration, but this does not necessarily lead 
towards reliable knowledge which elicits the same trust as scientific knowledge. We should also 
recollect, at this point, the hegemonic consensus which existed among scholars in the early decades 
of the 20th Century concerning the virtues of Empire and white superiority, linked to innate genetic 
IQ, eugenic social beliefs, and so on (Chitty 2007). This suggests that it is not scholarly community 
as such which leads to the kind of knowledge which reliably reflects reality and guides action: there 
is need for a particular epistemic approach. 
As Edwards points out:  
What is to prevent any epistemic community (re)producing a consensual but entirely false 
account of the world? How are pupils to be protected from a biased curriculum that 
discriminates against some groups? (Edwards 2014:179) 
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This is less applicable to natural sciences, but hidden ideologies may be at work even there, for 
example the tacit assumption that scientists do not need to raise ethical questions about how science 
is used or become concerned about the world their science describes.  
We should not underestimate the importance of academic disciplines and communities in their 
search for truth, but they do not guarantee it; they are often limited by their paradigms (see Wrigley 
2013) and can and should be questioned from within and without.  
Just as scholarly communities are not always a guarantee of reliable knowledge, we might also 
consider whether there are other networks outwith the academy which exercise a rigorous and 
fruitful search for knowledge: vernacular traditions of craftsmanship or indeed international 
Marxism, for example. Neither of these communities of knowledge and practice distance 
themselves from mundane realities, but in their different ways seek to transcend them.  
To be fair, Social Realists express an expansive view of epistemic communities which goes beyond 
local or national collections of scholars. Maton and Moore (2010) write of the special ‘capacity for 
intellectual fields to build powerful and cumulative knowledge over time’ (p6) and of a ‘coalition of 
minds extending across time and space’. Moore cites Bourdieu’s assertion that ‘A scientist is a 
scientific field made flesh’ (Bourdieu 2004:41, cited Moore 2009: 131) and that a ‘twenty-year-old 
mathematician can have twenty centuries of mathematics in his mind’. 
Moore and others make important and convincing arguments about the powerful workings of 
scientific communities and networks, and the rigour which comes from scholarly scepticism, 
empirical testing of hypotheses, and the norms of publication and peer review. The individual 
subjectivities of researchers are subsumed under the need to secure reliable knowledge. 
It is a deep-seated part of intellectual structures that questions are asked, debates take place; 
polemics and denunciations also often occur... (Collins 2000:28, cited Moore 2009:131) 
The underlying principle is that ‘all knowledge is fallible and open to revision’ (Moore 2009:136) 
However, if this applies to details it must also apply to entire paradigms and models of reality. It 
follows that truth building cannot simply be grounded in the smooth running of an academic 
community, even in the natural sciences - and intellectual fields such as anthropology or literature 
are likely to be even more turbulent and contested. (See Zipin et al 2015:13-14 for further 
discussion.) 
Critical Realism, ontology and critical thinking 
In line with the problem discussed above,  we find a misunderstanding of the term Critical Realism, 
deployed by Social Realists since around 2008 to strengthen their case. Crucially, trusting in the 
scholarly community as the guarantor of truth – or at least as good as we can get – is not what 
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Critical Realism is about. Critical Realism is essentially a recognition that science (natural but also 
social) seeks to dig below the surface of appearances and identify the underlying forces or depth-
structures. These forces are real but not always operative, being sometimes immobilised by other 
forces or working in unfavourable environments, and even when operative may not be clearly 
visible. The rigour of scientific procedure may be important in moving us reliably from perceived 
phenomena to underlying entities or forces, but it is reality (‘depth ontology’), not the sociality of 
knowledge production, which defines Critical Realism.  
Critical Realism, in both natural and social sciences, is based on a non-identity of reality and 
appearances. As Marx pointed out (1894, ch48):  
All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things 
directly coincided.   
That does not mean that we can somehow turn our backs on ‘profane’ appearances. Theory is 
needed to penetrate beyond the empirical and the actual to the real (Bhaskar 1978), but without 
empirical procedures of perception, investigation and verification this can open a door to fantasy.  
The Social Realist account that separating intellectual thought from mundane reality helps pro 
penetrate beyond common-sense appearances to the forces operating underneath shows a limited 
grasp of the Critical Realist project.  
A more accurate understanding of Critical Realism would steer the school curriculum towards more 
critical pedagogies. Whereas Lambert (2014:165)  emphasises the need for university disciplines to 
influence school subjects via exam boards, a Critical Realist would wish to initiate students into the 
art of seeing ‘below the surface’. Gail Edwards argues that the capacity to critique should be an 
essential part of school curriculum.  
Any school curriculum must be designed to require pupils’ evaluation of knowledge since 
they must engage critically with pre-existent structures. Given pupils’ standpoint, or 
structural location, neutrality in knowing is impossible because the objects of their 
knowledge include the value-laden social structures and conventions of which they are a 
part. (Edwards 2014:173) 
Rather than being a threat, she insists that standpoint is a vital lever towards truth.  
In the interests of strong objectivity, then, the experiences of a subjugated group within a 
particular social structure is a necessary starting point for interrogating reality in as much as 
this group is likely to pose questions that cannot arise in those groups whose lives are 
structured from a position of material advantage. This is not to say that the perspectives of 
working-class pupils are necessarily valid or objective accounts; rather, it is to say only that 
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a critical engagement with reality must take the perspectives and differential power relations 
within different structural locations into account on the journey towards stronger objectivity 
in knowing. (ibid:174)  
 
Powerful knowledge?      
Social Realists make great rhetorical play of the phrase ‘powerful knowledge’, yet it is by no means 
clear why it is powerful, how it exercises or mobilises power, or whom it might empower. Does it, 
for instance, support the less powerful against the more powerful, or simply increase the power of 
the already powerful? What activity is needed to mobilise its power? Does some knowledge deserve 
the description ‘powerful’  simply because it is sanctioned by established academic disciplines and 
communities? Perhaps ‘powerful’ is simply being used in the technical or instrumental sense of 
‘more useful’ or ‘more effective’.   
Whilst Social Realists do acknowledge the influence of social structure and culture on knowledge 
formation and distribution, this is downplayed, with unexpected silences at critical moments. Young 
(2014), for example, though criticising Michael Gove’s nostalgic conservatism, carefully avoids 
criticizing the limited English Baccalaureate (Ebacc), which famously disregards examination 
success in the arts or technologies.  
One struggles to find an acknowledgement that the curriculum is a selection from culture (Williams 
1961:66seq), nor an elucidation of the criteria that we should apply to selecting, other than trying to 
keep up with university-based research. We are left with generalised appeals to ‘the best that has 
been thought and said’ (Arnold 1869), powerful knowledge as the means to ‘develop conceptual 
thought’, and a dogmatic insistence that vernacular knowledge should have no place in the school 
curriculum. 
As Social Realism has moved nearer to discussing the actual curriculum of schools and school 
systems, this problem has become more acute. In the New Zealand context, for instance, Elizabeth 
Rata is sharp in her condemnation of the official status given to the Maori heritage – and some of 
her examples of ‘Maori science’ or ‘Maori mathematics’ do suggest serious distortion, subjectivism 
and relativism (Rata 2012:105seq). She has little to say, however, against the dominance of White 
majority values. It is a fair and perceptive summary that postmodernism has buried class analysis 
(ibid:89), as many socialists would agree (eg Callinicos 1990; Eagleton 1996); however the 
suggestion that ‘disciplinary knowledge’ is necessarily progressive and that ‘objective knowledge’ 
enables us to ‘think the unthinkable’ by transcending the world of our own experience (ibid:96) is 
unsupported by argument or exemplification.  
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Rata praises British Prime Minister David Cameron’s attack on multiculturalism (ibid:98) with no 
recognition of how this fits into his government’s wider political direction. Even Herder, cited as 
the historical originator of culturalism, is seriously misrepresented in Rata’s accusation that he 
wanted ‘to fix people in primordial bonds of kinship’ (ibid:105). (Her source Steven Lukes 
(2003:15) explicitly rejects such a one-sided interpretation.) 
Young even tries to co-opt Raymond Williams, a remarkable move given Williams’ seminal 
curricular idea of the ‘selective tradition’ (Williams 1961:68). This is particularly ironic given that 
the New Left critique of the established canon, in various fields, magnified by the student revolts of 
the late 1960s, provided a forceful impetus for the New Sociology of Education to question the 
doxa of established school curriculum. (This transfer of understanding did not only occur via 
educational sociology, of course; much of the debate was located in communities of subject 
specialists among teachers and university lecturers. See, for example, Medway et al 2014.)      
Really powerful knowledge: a curriculum for Social Justice 
The relationship between ‘powerful knowledge’ and social power is not clarified. Furthermore, 
Social Realism seems to place enormous emphasis on dangers arising from subaltern contributions, 
but seriously underplays those emanating from the economically and socially powerful. (See also 
Zipin 2015.) 
There is some value in the insistence that a return to Knowledge works in favour of social justice, 
given that it is socially marginalised young people who are most likely to be offered low-level 
vocational skills and denied access to such subjects as history. We should take seriously 
Haberman’s (1991) warning that young people growing up in poverty are fed a ‘pedagogy of 
poverty’ consisting of decontextualised exercises, undemanding closed questions and a dearth of 
ideas. In terms of distribution then (Fraser 1997) the Social Realists are correct. It is in terms of 
recognition that the problems emerge: the curriculum fails to reflect the lives of large sections of 
the population (Zipin et al. 2015:28-32).  
To follow Fraser’s thinking, this also becomes a barrier to participation, as disadvantaged students 
make less sense of content which belongs to someone else’s cultural capital and are unable to 
engage. A dramatic example of this was provided by the reading tests imposed on England’s 11-
year-olds in 2016, which confronted children with a text (Standards and Testing Agency 2016) 
about a garden party in a mansion with its own lake; the main characters row out to find a 
monument to one of their ancestors. The gulf was so great between the lifeworld of the child and 
the world of the text that large numbers of children were simply mystified by the text and could not 
begin to tackle the detailed questions. 
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At its best, the concept of ‘powerful knowledge’ is articulated by Social Realists with the intention 
of empowering young people to predict, explain, and envisage alternatives (Young et al 2014:74). 
However, the criteria used to select it (distant from everyday experience, systematic, specialist) are 
insufficient to identify knowledge which might actually give people power.  
Lambert (2014:177) proposes as selection criteria that such knowledge must be ‘outside the direct 
experience’, ‘developed by the wider disciplinary communities’, ‘develop systematicity in our 
thinking plus a deepening and broadening of our perspectives’, be ‘conceptual’ and may often take 
the form of ‘systems and models’, including maps. Some of these are useful criteria in fending off a 
debasement of school knowledge, but they are not sufficient as a basis for curriculum design.  
We might contrast ‘powerful knowledge’, as used by Social Realism, with the notion of ‘productive 
pedagogies’ (Lingard 2014) developed out of the Queensland School Reform Longitudinal Study. 
(Here, ‘pedagogy’ is used in a broader sense which includes curricular considerations.) The 
Queensland research showed that, despite an ethos of care for students,  
pedagogies of indifference failed to work with and across... differences [ethnic, gender, etc] 
but also failed to make a difference in their lack of both intellectual demand and 
connectedness to the world. (p193)  
Lingard also speaks of ‘pedagogies of the same’ – the standardised technicist learning found in 
high-stakes accountability regimes. Productive pedagogies, on the other hand, require both a 
seriousness in presenting key concepts and challenging ideas, and a commitment to respecting the 
lives of diverse students: there is no contradiction between the two. It is this unity-in-contradiction 
that must be upheld if we are seriously committed to powerful knowledge in the interest of social 
justice.  
Productive pedagogies, or pedagogies of difference, do not neglect the cognitive development of 
disadvantaged students. Citing Bourdieu, it is:   
absolutely necessary to give priority to those areas where the objective is to ensure that 
fundamental processes are thoughtfully and critically assimilated. These processes – the 
deductive, the experimental, the historical as well as the critical and reflective – should 
always be included (Bourdieu 1990:309, in Lingard 2014:196) 
However, social justice also demands critical social understanding, albeit of a more grounded kind, 
than much ‘critical pedagogy’ (ibid 197), and a ‘culture of respect for the history, the language and 
culture of the peoples represented in the classroom’ (Rose, 1995:414). In summary, productive 
pedagogies require:  
 intellectual quality 
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 connectedness 
 supportiveness 
 working with and valuing of difference (Lingard 2014).  
 
Conclusion 
The demand for intellectual quality (i.e. the first criterion of productive pedagogies, above) cannot 
just sit by itself. Indeed, without the other dimensions, it collapses into formalism, resulting in 
knowledge which is not only difficult – and some knowledge is hard to acquire - but inaccessible, 
irrelevant and disengaging.,The result might not be intellectual quality at all, but a substitution of 
regulations for theory, algorithms for problem-solving, and an arid abstraction rather than the rich 
knowledge which is imbricated with rich experience. These are the qualities which characterise the 
current English National Curriculum (see Wrigley 2014), despite the claim to privilege ‘knowledge’ 
and indeed the occasional rhetorical appeal to ‘powerful knowledge’. Raising intellectual demands 
has become a crude target-setting exercise, which places inappropriate pressures on children who 
are too young to bear them. Whether or not we agree with Young’s formulation ‘bringing 
knowledge back in’ (we might ask: was it ever absent?) there is currently a strong need to bring the 
child back in (Wrigley 2016).  
The social realist aspiration for knowledge of high intellectual quality ultimately begs the question: 
knowledge about what? Social Realism provides only a formal guidance on which knowledge to 
select for the school curriculum. It neglects the democratic need for critical literacy – a capacity to 
question. Critical epistemic practices provide a vital key to a high quality of understanding of 
everyday situations, as demonstrated by Noddings’ exemplary book ‘Critical lessons’ (2006) with 
its chapters about parents, homes, work and war. 
All students need knowledge which is powerful enough to challenge the distorted understandings of 
reality carried by ‘common sense’, but also – and this is indeed a challenge - some of the 
hegemonic orthodoxies accepted by academia. This process of critique may require us to mobilise 
students’ lifeworld knowledge, and help them to articulate an understanding which draws critically 
on their particular standpoints. Their everyday knowledge then becomes  
a necessary starting point for enquiry that should lead to a higher reflexive consciousness of 
their standpoint within the wider world – that is, to strong objectivity (Edwards 2014 :182). 
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Our curricular aim should be not only to satisfy everyone’s entitlement to Knowledge, but the 
capacity to apply it to significant matters in the interest of democracy and social justice. This would 
be truly powerful knowledge.  
 
Acknowledgement 
This paper owes a great deal to the influence of Raymond Williams across many decades. The 
question of what is worthwhile knowledge has remained central to my work. More immediately, I 
would like to thank my friends and colleagues Lew Zipin and Marie Brennan (writing with Aslam 
Fataar) and Gail Edwards for establishing the foundations on which I could build. Gail Edwards' 
incisive epistemological analysis was an invaluable support in the struggle to systematise my 
thinking and develop this paper.  
 
 
References 
Alexander, R (2000) Culture and pedagogy: International comparisons in primary education. 
Oxford: Blackwell 
Arnold, M (1869) Culture and anarchy. London: Thomas Nelson 
Bateson, G (1973) Steps to an ecology of mind. St Albans: Paladin 
Bernstein, B (1999) Vertical and horizontal discourse: An essay. British Journal of Sociology of 
Education 20(2), 157-173 
Bhaskar, R (1978) A realist theory of science. Hassocks: Harvester Press 
Bourdieu, P (2004) Science of science and reflexivity. Cambridge: Polity 
Bourdieu, P (1990) Principles for reflecting on the curriculum. Curriculum Journal 1(3), 307-14 
Bruner, J (1986) Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 
Callinicos, A (1990) Against postmodernism: A Marxist critique. Cambridge: Polity 
Chitty, C (2007) Eugenics, race and intelligence in education. London: Continuum 
Collins, R (2000) The sociology of philosophies: A global theory of intellectual change. Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press 
Drakakis, J ed (1985) Alternative Shakespeares. London: Methuen 
Durkheim, E (1983) Pragmatism and philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Eagleton, T (1996) The illusions of postmodernism. Oxford: Blackwell 
Eagleton, T (2016) Materialism. New Haven: Yale University Press 
Edwards, G (2014) Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity in the sociology of 
education. British Journal of Sociology of Education 35(2): 167-184 
Engeström, Y, Miettinen, R and Punamäki, R-L eds (1999) Perspectives on activity theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 24 
Fraser, N (1997) Justice interruptus: Critical reflections on the ‘postsocialist’ condition. London: 
Routledge 
Gilbert, S and  Gubar, S (1979) The madwoman in the attic: The woman writer and the nineteenth-
century imagination. New Haven: Yale University Press  
Haberman, M (1991) The pedagogy of poverty versus good teaching. Phi Delta Kappan, 73(4), 
290-4) 
Haraway, D (1988) Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of 
partial perspectives. Feminist Studies 14(3), 575-599 
Harding, S (1992) After the neutrality Ideal: Science, politics, and ‘strong objectivity’. Social 
Research 59(3), 567-587  
Hawkes, T ed (1996) Alternatives Shakespeares, volume 2. London: Routledge 
Hoadley, U and Jansen, J (2009) Curriculum: Organising knowledge for the classroom. Southern 
Africa: Oxford University Press 
Lambert, D (2014) Subject teachers in knowledge-led schools. In M Young and D Lambert (eds) 
Knowledge and the future school: curriculum and social justice. London: Bloomsbury 
Lingard, B (2014) Pedagogies of indifference. In B Lingard (ed) Politics, policies and pedagogies 
in education: The selected works of Bob Lingard. London: Routledge, pp192-209. (Originally 
published 2007 in International Journal of Inclusive Education 11(3) 
Lukes, S (2003) Liberals and cannibals: the implications of diversity. London: Verso 
Marx, K (1894) Capital, vol III. www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch48.htm 
(accessed 26 May 2017)  
Maton, K and Moore, R (2010) Coalitions of the mind. In K Maton and R Moore (eds) Social 
realism, knowledge and the sociology of education: Coalitions of the mind, 1-13. New York: 
Continuum 
McPhail, G (2011) The canon or the kids: Teachers and the recontextualisation of classical and 
popular music in the secondary school curriculum. Unpublished EdD thesis, University of 
Auckland, New Zealand 
Mead, G (1934) Mind, self and society from the standpint of a social behaviorist. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 
Medway, P, Hardcastle, J, Brewis, G and Crook, D (2014) English teachers in a postwar 
democracy: Emerging choice in London schools 1945-1965. London: Palgrave Macmillan 
Merleau-Ponty, M (1962) Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Moll, L (2014) Vygotsky and education. London: Routledge 
Moore, R (2009) Towards the sociology of truth. London: Continuum 
Moore, R and Muller, J (1999) The discourse of ‘voice’ and the problem of knowledge and identity 
in the sociology of education. British Journal of Sociology of Education 20(2) 189-206 
Moore, R and Young, M (2001) Knowledge and the curriculum in the sociology of education: 
Towards a reconceptualisation. British Journal of Sociology of Education 22(4), 445-461 
Muller, J (2000) Reclaiming knowledge: Social theory, curriculum and education. London: 
RoutledgeFalmer 
Noddings, N (2006) Critical lessons: What our schools should teach. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 25 
Pring, R (1972) Knowledge out of control, in Education for Teaching (Autumn 1972), reprinted as 
chapter 10 of R Pring (2004) Philosophy in education. London: Continuum 
Rata, E (2012) The politics of knowledge in education. Abingdon: Routledge 
Robbins, P  and Aydede, M eds (2009) The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Roberts, M (2014) Powerful knowledge and geographical education. The Curriculum Journal 
25(2): 187-209 
Rogoff, B and Lave, J eds (1984) Everyday cognition: Development in social context. Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press  
Rose, M (1995) Possible lives: The promise of public education in America . New York: Penguin.  
Rosen, M (2012) Dear Mr Gove. Marxism conference, London, July 2012 
http://swpradiocast.bandcamp.com/track/dear-mr-gove-marxism-2012    
Ryle, G (1949) The concept of mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin  
Said, E (1978) Orientalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Salomon, G ed (1993) Distributed cognitions: psychological and educational considerations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Standards and Testing Agency (2016) Key Stage 2 English reading booklet. www.satspapers.org  
Vygotsky, L (1987) The development of scientific concepts in childhood. In The collected works of 
L. S.Vygotsky: Problems of general psychology, including the volume Thinking and Speech, ed. R 
W Rieber and A S Carton, 167-241. New York: Plenum Press 
Vygotsky, L (1997) Educational psychology. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press 
Wenger, E (1998) Communities of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Wertsch, J (1990) The voice of rationality in a sociocultural approach to mind. In L Moll (ed) 
Vygotsky and education: Instructional implications and applications of sociohistorical psychology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Whitty, G and Young, M eds (1976) Explorations in the politics of school knowledge. Driffield: 
Nafferton Books 
Williams, R (1961) The long revolution. London: Chatto and Windus 
Williams, R (1973) The country and the city. London: Chatto and Windus 
Wrigley, T (2003) Schools of hope: A new agenda for school improvement. Stoke: Trentham 
Wrigley, T (2013) Rethinking School Effectiveness and Improvement: a question of paradigms 
Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 34(1) 
Wrigley, T (2014) The politics of curriculum in schools. London: Centre for Labour and Social 
Studies (CLASS) http://classonline.org.uk/pubs/item/the-politics-of-curriculum-in-schools 
Wrigley, T (2016) Bringing the child back in. Primary First, May 2016.  
Wulf, C (2005) Zur Genese des Sozialen: Mimesis, Performativität, Ritual. Bielefeld: transcript 
Verlag 
Young, M ed (1971) Knowledge and control: New directions for the sociology of education. 
London: Collier-Macmillan.  
Young, M (2000) Rescuing the sociology of educational knowledge from the extremes of voice 
discourse: Towards a new theoretical basis for the sociology of the curriculum. British Journal of 
Sociology of Education 21(4), 523-536 
 26 
Young, M (2008) Bringing knowledge back in: From social constructivism to social realism in the 
sociology of education. London: Routledge 
Young, M (2010) Why educators must differentiate knowledge from experience. Pacific-Asian 
Education, 22(1), 9-20 
Young,  M (2014) The curriculum and the entitlement to knowledge, given at a seminar organised 
by Cambridge Assessment Network, 25 March.  
http://www.cambridgeassessment.org.uk/Images/166279-the-curriculum-and-the-entitlement-to-
knowledge-prof-michael-young.pdf  
Young, M and Whitty, G eds (1977) Society, state and schooling. Ringmer: Falmer Press 
Young, M and Lambert, D with Roberts, C and Roberts, M (2014) Knowledge and the future 
school: Curriculum and social justice. London: Bloomsbury 
Zipin, L (2015) Chasing curricular justice: How complex ethical vexations of redistributing 
cultural capital bring dialectics to the door of aporia. Southern African Review of Education 
21(2):91-109  
Zipin, L, Fataar, A and Brennan, M (2015) Can social realism do social justice? Debating the 
warrants for curriculum knowledge selection. Education as Change 19(2), 9-36 
 
 
 
 
